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INTERPRETING PRACTICE: 
DILTHEY, EPISTEMOLOGY, AND 
THE HERMENEUTICS OF HISTORICAL LIFE
Eric Sean Nelson
Abstract: This paper explores Dilthey’s radical transformation of epistemol-
ogy and the human sciences through his projects of a critique of historically 
embodied reason and his hermeneutics of historically mediated life. Answering 
criticisms that Dilthey overly depends on epistemology, I show how for Dilthey 
neither philosophy nor the human sciences should be reduced to their theoretical, 
epistemological, or cognitive dimensions. Dilthey approaches both immediate 
knowing (Wissen) and theoretical knowledge (Erkenntnis) in the context of a 
hermeneutical phenomenology of historical life. Knowing is not an isolated activ-
ity but an interpretive and self-interpretive practice oriented by situated refl exive 
awareness (Innewerden) and self-refl ection (Selbstbesinnung). As embedded in an 
historical relational context, knowing does not only consist of epistemic validity 
claims about representational contents but is fundamentally practical, involving 
all of human existence. Empirically informed Besinnung, with its double refer-
ence to sense as meaning and bodily awareness, orients Dilthey’s inquiry rather 
than the “irrationalism” of immediate intuition or the “rationalism” of abstract 
epistemological reasoning.
1. Introduction: Questioning Epistemology
Wilhelm Dilthey’s project of a “critique of historical reason” has been criticized by 
Heidegger and Gadamer for its “epistemological orientation.”1 Yet for Dilthey neither 
philosophy nor the human sciences are reducible to their epistemological and theoretical 
dimensions (GS 8: 179).2 In response to such criticisms, this paper will illustrate how 
Dilthey accounts for both “immediate knowing” (Wissen) and “theoretical knowledge” 
(Erkenntnis) in historical inquiry and the human sciences in the context of what can be 
described as a hermeneutical phenomenology of historical life. In Dilthey’s radical contex-
tualizing transformation of epistemology, which does not reject it completely for the sake 
of ontology as Heidegger and Gadamer advocate, knowing is not an abstract, disembodied, 
and isolated theorizing. Knowing is an interpretive and self-interpretive practice oriented 
by refl exive awareness (Innewerden) and potentially by self-refl ection (Selbstbesinnung). 
Knowing is embedded in a social-historical relational context or nexus (Zusammenhang) 
such that for Dilthey it is never merely epistemic but fundamentally practical (GS 19: 79). 
Although Dilthey is accused of objectivism and scientism by proponents of ontological 
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hermeneutics and subjectivism and relativism by advocates of transcendental philosophy 
and logical positivism,3 I argue that it is empirically informed Besinnung, with the double 
signifi cance of “sense” (Sinn) as meaning and bodily awareness rooted in the relational 
life-nexus, that orients Dilthey’s endeavor rather than the “irrationalism” of a direct and 
immediate intuition or feeling of life—as in popular conceptions of romanticism and life-
philosophy—or the “rationalism” of abstract epistemological refl ection.
Dilthey’s thinking of Erlebnis and Besinnung, lived-contextual-experience and inter-
pretive refl ection, transformed but did not break all links with the epistemological and 
critical legacy of modern philosophy, as Dilthey reinterpreted rather than rejected the 
propensity of philosophy and the sciences toward achieving objectivity, universality, and 
truth. Inquiry necessarily involves epistemic and methodological questions in philosophy 
and the sciences, yet this pursuit of knowledge and self-knowledge can only become intel-
ligible in relation to the context of historical self-interpreting life from which it emerged 
and unpredictably remerges anew and by itself being both philosophical and empirical 
or—to employ a presently fashionable term—interdisciplinary.
I contend in this paper that this “context of historical life” (1) consists of interconnected 
and often confl icting practices allowing for various forms of identifi cation and differentia-
tion, socialization and individuation, and (2) operates as the nexus or crossing from which 
relations and dis-relations of self and world, action and structure, theory and practice can be 
articulated. Whereas philosophical refl ection on the human sciences pursues the latter, the 
human sciences investigate the former nexus of the singular and the whole in one or more of 
its concrete forms. This includes the affi nities and differences of the processes and structures 
of history and society as well as the human actions and events occurring in the context of these 
processes and structures. Historical life is a complex and differentiated nexus of structures and 
events, systems and actions, groups and individuals, refl exively disclosed in awareness and 
understanding and engaged in interpretation, refl ection, and empirical-theoretical research.
Dilthey is often supposed to have radically separated the natural and the human, repro-
ducing the idealistic duality between nature (Natur) and spirit (Geist) or the Neo-Kantian 
distinction between facticity and validity.4 It is interesting, however, that this difference is 
not an ontological one postulating two different kinds of world (nature and spirit) but is an 
epistemic and methodological one concerning the point of departure and aims of the natural 
and human sciences. The human sciences as sciences (Wissenschaften) share the same ten-
dency toward objectivity, universality, and validity as the natural sciences, yet this aim and 
its functions diverge through the practices of the human sciences. Objectivity in the human 
sciences does not so much concern the value-neutral and mathematical-deductive model 
of physical objects as it does the linking of lived-experiences with the social-historical 
structures that inform them (GS 7: 3). This objectivity cannot consist of a copying of reality 
as it is or in a mimetic reproduction of how it was, is, or will be (ibid.). The constructions 
of the human sciences are always bound to and mediated by the formations of historical 
life, already relating the unique, the accidental, and the momentary to the nexus of norms, 
values, and meanings operative in social-historical reality. Such inquiry presupposes and 
explicates this context of relations between the unique and the general without being able 
to sublimate or eliminate it to the extent that natural scientifi c inquiry does, as their very 
practice and aim is the “historical presentation of the singular occurrence.”5
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Dilthey argued for relating the human sciences to their contextual whole, which as open, 
plural, and confl ictual evades systematic totalization, in which the historical presentation 
and the occurrence of the unique and individual can be illuminated. The signifi cance of the 
event of the singular indicates that Dilthey’s concern is not reductively epistemological, 
although questions of knowledge need to be included in the self-refl ection that accompanies 
the possibilities of historical vision (GS 7: 4). As it is no longer the founding of concep-
tual knowledge in rational consciousness, empirical perception, or their transcendental 
conditions, epistemology is reoriented by reinterpreting knowledge, consciousness, and 
perception in relation to their lived, embodied, and performative life-contexts. Dilthey 
resituated epistemology and scientifi c inquiry, which are determined by their object and 
the way (how) the object is given (GS 7: 18), in relation to a pre-refl ective refl exive aware-
ness (Innewerden) of life, the inherently historical performance and practice of a life, 
and the lived hermeneutical categories of expression, understanding, and interpretation. 
Epistemology is not the grounding of conceptual knowledge in consciousness, whether 
in rational cognition, speculative self-intuition, or empirical perception, but the articula-
tion of knowledge and consciousness in their relational life-contexts, which involve the 
fullness, plurality, and confl icts of worldly existence. Dilthey accordingly situated the 
sciences in relation to a prescientifi c life-nexus or life-world and its various forms of 
understanding.6
2. Knowing in the Context of Historical Life
Jürgen Habermas notes in Knowledge and Human Interests that both the human and natural 
sciences presuppose the symbolic interaction through which the life-world is reproduced, 
but the human sciences also take this “comprehensive life-context” as an object of research.7 
It is from this relational context that the human and natural sciences emerge, which are 
differentiated by how they relate to this context. According to Habermas, the primary 
difference is epistemic and methodological, rather than ontological, and is constituted by 
a different cognitive interest.8 Whereas the natural sciences are constituted by a technical 
interest in controlling and using things through objective methods, the human sciences are 
constituted by a practical interest in intersubjectively reproduced meanings, norms, and 
values.9 Although Habermas’s account clearly relies on Dilthey, Dilthey did not simply 
develop an epistemology of the methodology of the human sciences, as Gadamer nega-
tively and Habermas positively claim. Dilthey’s thought is twofold as (1) he problematized 
the modern project of the theory of knowledge by approaching knowledge through his 
“critique of historical reason,” and (2) he reinterpreted methodological concepts inherited 
from traditional hermeneutics such as understanding and interpretation in relation to the 
lived practices and expressions of historical life.
Whereas hermeneutics traditionally focused on the philology of Biblical and classical 
texts, and commenting on canonical texts remained central to Gadamer’s philosophical 
hermeneutics, it becomes—via Schleiermacher’s broadening of hermeneutics beyond 
literary works and products of spirit to all varieties of communication10—the empirically 
oriented interpretation of historically situated practices in Dilthey. As empirically informed, 
the interpretive strategies of the human sciences cannot be merely literary or philologi-
cal, and they cannot a priori exclude considerations of epistemology, methodology, and 
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theory in the name of “truth.” Likewise, the distance (Abstand) purportedly introduced 
by refl ection and theoretical cognition in modernity is not an alien and rootless construct 
invented by scientifi c inquiry and “theory.” Distances and interruptions already operate 
in the immanence of the everyday life-world insofar as it is not a seamless totality and its 
transmission through tradition is not a continuous and unalterable stream. For Dilthey, 
the present is not even purely present to itself, as the present “as such” cannot be expe-
rienced (GS 7: 73). Temporality is not only lived as continuity but as discontinuity, it 
involves distances in relation to the past, the future, and even the present moment itself.11 
The plural character of historicity and temporality entails the necessity of experientially 
and experimentally engaging the world. Georg Misch described this as Dilthey’s “life-
positivism.”12 This non-reductive “positivism” advocates uncoerced empirical inquiry 
(“unbefangene Empirie”; GS 1: 81), or empiria without doctrinal empiricism (“Empirie, 
nicht Empirismus”; GS 19: 17), in contrast to the eliminative and reductive programs of 
logical positivism and scientistic empiricism.13
Dilthey’s debts to the “philosophy of spirit” from Leibniz and Kant to Hegel and 
Schleiermacher did not prevent him from rejecting idealism and transforming the notion 
of “spirit” (Geist) through its contextualization. Contrary to foundationalist epistemology 
and speculative metaphysics, Dilthey argued that there can be no one single theory of 
knowledge that encompasses and systematizes all forms of knowing (GS 7: 4). Dilthey 
bases this radical epistemic pluralism on the past failures of such projects in contrast 
with the historically actual, philosophically legitimate, and pragmatically successful 
multiplicity of the sciences. Indeed, such epistemic an-archy is not only a historical 
fact but a genuine goal of inquiry (GS 7: 4). The philosophy of spirit (Philosophie des 
Geistes), which is still one systematic discipline for Hegel and Schleiermacher, becomes 
the multiple yet interconnected “spiritual” or human-sciences (Geisteswissenschaften) in 
Dilthey.14 Dilthey’s pluralism undermined the idea of systematic totality driven by one 
determinate goal—whether understood as the unity of science, a speculative actuality, 
or a regulative demand—by suggesting what I call a “weak holism” without fi nality. 
That is, a sense of the whole as fl uid and multiple relational context or nexus that evades 
being grasped through a formula or as a unity. Knowing is not so much concerned with 
achieving or imposing an abstract unity as it is with refl ectively and practically engaging 
the lived connectedness or nexus (Zusammenhang) of the tendencies of life, which are 
temporally-historically formed (GS 7: 185).
Dilthey’s anti-systematic tendencies are often decried but can be positively interpreted. 
Based on Dilthey’s works, the whole as an infi nite depth, texture, and indeterminate-
determinate context of relations (Zusammenhang) can be distinguished from relative 
“wholes” or “totalities” of structural-functional systems of the external organization of 
society (economy and state), the realms of cultural reproduction (from ordinary life to the 
arts and sciences), and of the purposiveness of the individual person. A differentiated or 
structural “totality” in Dilthey’s sense is a singular within a wider context and network of 
relations. This relational yet non-identical context cannot be fully disclosed to or compre-
hended by any person, group, or society to the degree that they are perspectival participants 
within it. Human life is accordingly not transparent to itself in its immanence. As it fails 
to directly or immediately grasp, intuit, or know itself, it strives to understand, express, 
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and interpret itself, and by doing so it transforms itself. Human life is only accessible 
through its mediated expressions and practices, i.e., through experience, language, and 
history (GS 1: xviii/SW I: 51). Nevertheless, life is characterized not only by experiential, 
linguistic, and historical fi nitude in Dilthey but further by a constitutive ungroundability 
(Unbegründbarkeit), unfathomability (Unergründlichkeit), and immeasurability (Un-
ermesslichkeit). These can be experienced in “limit-situations” of uncanniness, yet for 
Dilthey such feelings and experiences are also disclosed as the fullness and openness 
of life. As we do not know whether this ineffability is immanent to life or transcends it, 
it provides no cognitive justifi cation for metaphysics or theology. Life is not so much 
revealed as one cosmic mystery or religious secret, guaranteeing or reestablishing the 
authority of traditional philosophy and religion; it is felt and experienced in diverse ways 
of “multiple provenance” that are hermeneutically and empirically investigated in the 
human sciences. Likewise, as the wholeness of life and singularity of a life are partially 
and perspectivally revealed in sensuous experience, imagination, refl ection, and cognition, 
life is addressed yet not fully or defi nitely comprehended through the activities of “spirit” 
or art, philosophy, and religion. Given its inherently plural and confl icting character, in 
an argument that infl uenced Rudolf Carnap, metaphysics at best expresses a particular 
feeling and attitude about life rather than its unconditional truth.15 As all thought is rooted 
in and oriented by a “feeling of life,” which does not a priori or analytically contain its 
own answer, it should not be reduced to scientifi c rationality pace Carnap but calls for the 
indirect, experimental, and revisable approaches of hermeneutical interpretation tracing 
the complex features of historically mediated life.
Historical life is addressed in a number of ways in the human sciences, including 
causal, structural-functional, and interpretive approaches. These are related to the dy-
namic productive nexus (Wirkungzusammenhang) of historical life, which requires an 
interpretive orientation to the extent that even the most constant causal relations are ap-
propriated, utilized, and reinterpreted through human practices. Similarly, even the most 
persistent structural systems such as the state and the economy cannot assume, fi xate, or 
ignore their environment (their “outside”) without signifi cant consequences.16 Causality 
and functionality are not ineffective in human life, since Dilthey is not the dualist he is 
occasionally thought to be, but practically taken up in a given productive nexus that his-
torically interlinks facticity and meaning, nature and spirit. The infi nity of relations that 
constitute a form of historical life are not primarily to be approached through a hypotheti-
cal-deductive or structural-functional logic, which subsume particulars under a universal 
covering law or systematic teleological principle, insofar as historically mediated and 
plural life calls for an “oscillation” between singular and whole, individual and society, 
and practice and structure. This incessant fl uctuation, due to human fi nitude and later called 
the “hermeneutical circle,” moves between the concrete givenness of lived-experience 
and its contexts. Wavering between the singular and whole without deciding for one over 
the other, this is not a “circle” in the sense of a closed circuit or systematic totality. Nor 
is it a speculative circle that explicates self-related meaning while re-appropriating every 
disruption of appropriation, nor the functionalist interaction of an organism or system 
with its environment. The so-called hermeneutical circle is an intercrossing and between, 
i.e., the relatedness of the whole and the singular frequently articulated by Schleiermacher 
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and Dilthey in terms of the typical and the unique. As the complex relations of life cannot 
be captured in thought without excess and remainder, antinomy and aporia, the circle is 
constituted in the incomplete relation between meaning and facticity. In this anti-reduc-
tive logic, neither singular nor context is taken as reducible to the other as in teleological, 
functional, or causal-effi cient explanation.
3. Revisiting Understanding
Ordinary everyday understanding (Verstehen) is a primary example of oscillation in human 
life, as it occurs in real processes between self and other involving relations of reciproc-
ity and dependence (GS 7: 141, 143, 152). Understanding, as Habermas also notes, is 
reciprocal to the extent that each reaches out toward the other. Understanding that is non-
reciprocal or a one-way grasping of the other cannot be understanding at all, although it 
can be perhaps some form of feeling or knowledge. Unlike Habermas, the reciprocity of 
understanding does not necessarily presuppose or aim at symmetry, identity, and equality, 
as it involves myriad incalculable differences of individuality. Not to mention that even 
living others can be absent, and unable to respond for a variety of reasons, interpretation 
is inevitably short-circuited and incomplete. The differences between individuals are 
elucidated through various social categories and types, including consensus, yet are irre-
ducible to them as these types are indefi nite nominal approximations that need to become 
more determinate through experience of the individuality of the other. As understanding 
involves (1) the performative reciprocity of self and other and (2) awareness of what is 
general and unique (GS 7: 152), it is caught up in an explicatory circle between identity 
and alterity and typicality and singularity. Schleiermacher noted that interpretation takes its 
point of departure from this midpoint, or oscillating between, as sameness would already 
be understood and utter difference is incomprehensible.17 Likewise, interpretation does 
not take its point of departure from pure universality or singularity, as these are what it 
seeks to articulate. Already bound to the endless task of understanding, and therefore of 
interpretation and refl ection, because of its fi nite and interrupted character, the self does 
not experience itself as an independent monad positing and constructing its world but as 
dependent on, interdependent with, and conditioned by others and its world (GS 5: 135). 
The situatedness of understanding is its very possibility. Not only is it informed by its 
own presuppositions and prejudices, understanding only reaches toward others and back 
to itself in its social and bodily dependence, conditionality, and contextuality.
Understanding moves from the self toward the other as a unique whole of its own, yet 
the indeterminability of the fi nite particular (i.e., the singular) destabilizes the movement of 
articulating the unique whole of a life, compelling understanding to waver and backtrack to 
the typical and schematic even in the midst of great biographical and psychological detail. 
According to Dilthey the “individual is ineffable” (GS 13/1: 1; GS 5: 330), and this impos-
sibility of knowing the individual other constitutes the movement of understanding and the 
explicative circle between self and other as intrinsically fl uctuating. Common to all ways 
of understanding “is the progression which goes from the apprehension of indeterminate-
determinate parts to apprehend the sense of the whole, and which alternately attempts to 
use this sense to determine the part more precisely. Failure occurs, since particular parts 
resist being so understood” (GS 7: 227). The interpretive circle of knowing and life in 
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lived-experience is infi nite: “Since lived experience is unfathomable and no thought can 
penetrate behind it, since cognition itself only arises in connection with it, and since the 
consciousness of lived experience is deepened in that experience, this task is accordingly 
unending” (GS 7: 225). The apparent “bad infi nity” of hermeneutics from Hegel’s per-
spective, and the lack of a conclusive transcendence or absolute, is the very possibility as 
well as the risk of understanding and knowledge for a fi nite relational being.
Verstehen can be but is not necessarily the abstracting, inherently intellectualized, pro-
cess that Tina Chanter following Levinas criticizes in Heidegger.18 Levinas’s criticism fairly 
or unfairly places Heidegger in the Neo-Kantian tradition of his teacher Rickert. For Rick-
ert, understanding aims at the non-sensuous meaning and intelligible validity of cultural 
goods and ideal values. It has no pertinent perceptual, psycho-physical, or psychological 
dimensions, insofar as these are excluded from understanding and included in the natural 
scientifi c causal investigation of value- and meaning-free nature.19 Dilthey, notoriously 
for his transcendental and ontological critics, did not exclude psychology, giving rise to 
the charge of a “psychologism” that reduces meaning and validity to the facticity of the 
perceptual and the sensuous. This criticism distorts the signifi cance of understanding in 
Dilthey, for whom it is a refl exive, bodily-perceptual, and social-historical practice.
First, Dilthey situates understanding in the pre-refl ective and refl exive self-awareness 
in which the bodily self is co-given or co-original with others and things through their 
mutual resistance. From out of this bodily and perceptually experienced between of the 
co-givenness of self and other, self, others, and world are differentiated through experi-
ences of the facticity, materiality, and resistance of that which confounds and reverses 
will, thought, and emotion (GS 5: 90–138). Life is, Dilthey contends, fi rst “there” (da) in 
this pre-refl ective and refl exive self-feeling.20 The refl exive awareness of the cogivenness 
of self and world is the non-refl ective basis from which consciousness and self-refl ection 
emerge. They are formed in the cogivenness, resistance, and tension of self and world in 
which a life is “there-for-me.” Consciousness and refl ection are bound to the alterity and 
non-identity that does not preclude but allows the differentiation and social-historical 
individuation of the self to occur.
Second, prior to Merleau-Ponty, Dilthey promoted the “primacy of perception” over 
representation (GS 19: 117). Although Dilthey contributed to the critique of spatializing 
the temporal also seen in Bergson and the early Heidegger,21 he argued that spatiality is 
irreducible to temporality since feeling, which is “originally there” and does not origi-
nate in representation (GS 18: 152), is spatially as well as temporally oriented (GS 18: 
148). Through spatial orientation and worldly resistance to the body, the lived-category 
of thingliness emerges from how the world is experienced (GS 19, 23). The self as lived 
body is hence already the basis for treating the body as a thing rather than this being 
merely an imposition of modern scientifi c thought. Understanding, situated in yet more 
than refl exivity and feeling, likewise retains a reference to spatially oriented bodily feel-
ing (GS 18: 148).22 Understanding is fi rst of all based in the self-feeling of bodily being 
in the world. It is from out of this prerefl ective yet refl exive bodily feeling of life that 
the “self” is formed (GS 18: 175) and refl ective self-consciousness is grounded (GS 19: 
154). Understanding is fundamentally bodily and worldly, and the other cannot begin to 
be understood through disembodied values and norms.
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Understanding is refl exive (self-relating), bodily-perceptual, and social, historical and 
cultural. Without each of these, it could not begin to encounter the other. Contrary to both 
physicalism and mentalism, the body can and needs to be articulated both in relation to 
its physical as well as its social-historical environment rather than being ahistorically 
isolated as a physiological apparatus or reduced to a function of consciousness (GS 5: 
225). Dilthey advocated an account of understanding situated in the body and a particular 
environment and epoch.23 The strength of his approach lies precisely in articulating the 
connectedness of the bodily and historical aspects of understanding. For Dilthey, embodi-
ment and culture, materiality and historicity, are interconnected both in the formation of 
historical worlds and in their human scientifi c inquiry.
4. Understanding Truth, Action, and Expression
In a late posthumously published work, The Understanding of Other Persons and their 
Expressions of Life (written around 1910), Dilthey locates the interpretative strategies 
of the human sciences within the context of the elementary forms of understanding that 
characterizes human life. Interpretation and explanation both presuppose understanding 
within a life-nexus. Such understanding is not only a question of scientifi c access, as 
Dilthey described it as fundamentally world-opening (GS 7: 205). Understanding can 
aim at the truth or validity that concerns Gadamer and Habermas and, indeed, Dilthey 
portrayed this kind of understanding as the most complete (GS 7: 206). More basically, 
however, understanding can concern itself with the relatedness and facticity in which hu-
man expressions occur. The understanding of validity claims says nothing to the person 
who explores understanding in relation “to the dark background and the fullness of psy-
chic life. No indication of the peculiarities of life from which it arose is found here, and 
it follows directly from its specifi c character that we are not required to go back to the 
psychic context” (GS 7: 206). Contrary to the psychologism ascribed to Dilthey, validity 
claims as validity claims require no reference to the context from which they genetically 
arose. As such, they are the most complete forms of human expressions in the sense that 
their form and content can be considered on their own terms.
The human sciences, including psychology, do not investigate the universal objects of 
mathematics and logic. They are motivated to understand individuals by addressing the 
psycho-physical and social-historical contexts in which human expressions and practices 
occur, including practices concerning universal values and validity claims. The human 
sciences should investigate what appears as a discourse of pure validity claims from a 
practical perspective, as when the sociology of science investigates the contingent origins 
and motives associated with the formation of a new scientifi c theory. In this sense, as 
Neo-Freudian cultural analysis illustrates, psychological inquiry can play a fruitful role 
in human scientifi c inquiry. More radically, the human sciences need to engage the very 
facticity of human existence by investigating its never fully visible context and the richness 
and multiplicity of life in which human practices occur. Understanding the other entails 
approaching the other through interpretation as singular in its relational context, and this 
is only possible by acknowledging the uncertainty and impossibility of understanding, 
i.e., that the individual is ineffable and for that very reason—contrary to the early Witt-
genstein—we must communicate and interpret.24
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Dilthey maintained both the ineffability of the individual and the possibility of un-
derstanding any expression of human life. These claims are consistent, according to 
Eugene Gendlin, as any human expression is in principle understandable, no matter how 
unique, because the more unique a human expression is, the more it is overdetermined by 
a multiplicity of meanings and, hence, the more possibilities there are for understanding 
it.25 As expressive in the world, and as plural in contrast to an inapproachable, isolated, 
and self-enclosed monadic unity, the other cannot be completely other to me even as her 
otherness cannot be eliminated. Understanding the other presupposes understanding the 
other’s non-identity, i.e., that the other is not me. Instead of inevitably being an imposition 
of a schema or standard onto the other, understanding and interpretation can potentially 
be the widening and transformation of our own experience. “Transposition is transforma-
tion” according to Dilthey (GS 5: 354/ SW IV: 253). Emphasizing the transformative role 
of memory and imagination in encountering others, intersubjective interactions can lead 
beyond the gathering of additional cognitive information to altered understandings of 
the other and of oneself. The other is not a construct or product of the self; it can answer, 
challenge, and change the self that addresses it.
Dilthey claimed that we have “experience of ourselves; but we do not understand 
ourselves. Everything about us is of course self-evident to us, but we have no standard 
with which to measure ourselves” (GS 7: 225). Since we knowers do not know ourselves, 
much less others, understanding is tentative and in need of constant renewal: “In our lived 
experience, our own self was comprehensible neither in the form of its fl ow nor in the 
depth of that which it contains. For like an island, the small sphere of conscious life rises 
out of inaccessible depths. But expression comes up from these depths. It is creative; and 
thus life becomes accessible to us in understanding, accessible as a re-creation of creation” 
(GS 7: 220). Understanding of self and others is inherently recreative and transformative 
under conditions of uncertainty such that interpretation, no matter how methodologically 
informed, is an art rather than the mechanical application of a rule. It is also an art to the 
extent that understanding has a singularity (ein Einzelnes) as its object (GS 7: 212). Although 
such uniqueness signifi es the impossibility of understanding as a cognitive knowledge that 
subordinates the particular to the universal, understanding can open up a world and elucidate 
it through the fundamental expressiveness and responsiveness of life. Understanding enacts 
itself as a situated practice through the mediations of the life that it is and the life other than 
itself: The unknownness of the singular individual “invites, for its own sake, newer and 
deeper investigations by the understanding; and in such understanding the realm of individu-
als, which embraces humans and their creations, becomes accessible” (GS 7: 212).
Individuals understand (verstehen) lived-experience (Erlebnis) indirectly or interpre-
tively through their own and other’s mediated life-expression (Lebensausdruck). Dilthey 
distinguished in The Understanding of Other Persons and their Expressions of Life three 
classes of “life-expressions” (later adopted in Habermas’s theory of communicative action): 
(1) concepts, judgments, and theories concerning validity claims that can be true or false 
(GS 7: 205); (2) actions; and (3) expressions of lived-experience (Erlebnis) (GS 7: 206). 
Whereas the fi rst group of expressions expresses a cognitive interest in truth, and can be 
evaluated as true or false, the two subsequent groups concern enactment, performance, 
and practice rather than validity as such.
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An action, according to Dilthey, “does not originate from an intention to communicate, 
but because of its relation to a purpose, this purpose is given through it” (GS 7: 206). Ac-
tions can be considered in their historical situation and life-context, fi gure and background, 
and are the enactment of a life in relation to purposes or goals, such that the multiplicity 
and fullness of life (i.e., possibility) becomes something particular in the act (GS 7: 206). 
Through his analysis of action, Dilthey presents life as a realm of multiplicity and pos-
sibility, and the virtuality discussed with York in their correspondence. Life becomes a 
life associated with a biography, or is individuated, through its own activity in relation to 
its conditions. Here too validity claims can be made about the rightness and wrongness, 
correctness and incorrectness, appropriateness and inappropriateness of actions. These 
actions are evaluated according to individual and social purposes, norms, and values that 
are themselves matters of communication.
The third group consists of the expression of lived-experience: “There is a special 
relation between it [i.e., the expression], the life from which it sprang, and the understand-
ing which it brings about. The expression can indeed contain more of the psychic nexus 
than any introspection can reveal. It raises life out of depths which are unilluminated by 
consciousness; but at the same time it lies in the nature of lived experience that the rela-
tionship between this expression and the spiritual or human meaning which is expressed 
in it can only very approximately be taken as a basis for the understanding. The expres-
sion of lived experience does not fall under the judgment ‘true’ or ‘false’ but rather that 
of truthfulness and untruthfulness” (GS 7: 206).
Action and the expression of lived-experience are not validity claims, although they 
can be brought into relation to them as moral rightness and personal expressiveness 
through language. Action and lived-experience relate back to the relational life-nexus, 
which cannot be assumed to be transparent and intelligible in communication free of 
domination or mutual understanding. It is the detachment of the analysis of understand-
ing and expression from its basis in lived-experience and its life-context that undermines 
Habermas’s appropriation of Dilthey’s hermeneutics, as this life-nexus is not directly 
cognitively or intentionally available. Language is fundamentally rooted in the facticity of 
life that constantly challenges its expression and interpretation. Life is not only conscious 
life, it is “unconscious” in the sense of being virtual (i.e., characterized by multiplicity 
and possibility) and unmasterable in its facticity by an individual or collective subject.26 
Dilthey recognizes the facticity of life without reifying it into the irrational. Rather, given 
the conditions of human knowledge and understanding, “in the confi nes between knowing 
and doing, a sphere emerges in which life is disclosed at a depth not open to observation, 
refl ection and theory” (GS 7: 125).
5. Experience, Refl ection, and History 
Interpretive refl ection (Besinnung) presupposes and engages a relational sphere of self 
and other given in a pretheoretical refl exive awareness (Innewerden) that occurs prior to 
conceptual thought.27 The crucial difference between refl ection and the refl exivity that 
it presupposes is lost in Gadamer and Habermas’s appropriation of Dilthey’s hermeneu-
tics. Both reduce Dilthey’s category of the refl exive to the refl ective, categorizing him 
with the “philosophy of consciousness.”28 Contrary to such assessments, I propose that 
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Dilthey contextualized consciousness and the epistemological subject of modern western 
philosophy. He did not consider the methodological and theoretical considerations of the 
human sciences the whole of understanding nor, however, is such refl ection on the human 
sciences extrinsic to the question of understanding itself.
Refl ection strives through language for the universal, typical, and general. Yet refl ec-
tion cannot escape its tension with the facticity of life and the multiplicity of the given 
(GS 7: 6–7). Although thought moves from the singular, accidental and the already given 
to the necessary and the universal, it is persistently bound through need, desire, and 
compulsion to the lived and the given (GS 7: 7). Such considerations are not an invitation 
to irrationalism or skepticism but rather to more rigorously relate thoughts and concepts 
back to their context in lived-experience (GS 7: 12). From this context, Dilthey described 
the cogivenness of self and world and the correlation between lived-experience (Erlebnis) 
and givenness (Gegebenheit). In this sense, Dilthey’s philosophy of the human sciences 
has a phenomenological dimension in which “phenomenology” is the interpretation of 
historical consciousness and the empirical life to which it is bound. The early Dilthey 
accordingly claimed that he is pursuing the tendency of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit 
under altered conditions (GS 18: 5). That is, a phenomenology of the empirical rather than 
the ideal subject, of empirical consciousness and its conditions (GS 7: 12).
The interpretive fore-concepts (Vorbegriffe) of Dilthey’s descriptive psychology are 
not unalterable or unchanging conditions but rather historically variable. They do not 
reach back to a priori conditions or a pure ego behind life but establish the conditions of 
articulating the structural relations of the empirical life of consciousness (GS 7: 13n). 
Descriptive psychology is only concerned with the factical (Tatsächlichen: GS 7: 14). This 
description is only of lived experience, and the historical expressions of life through which 
it is understood and interpreted, the content of which is not reducible to the whole (GS 
7: 19). Description reveals the structural relations that Dilthey analyzed as comportment, 
content, and act (GS 7: 21–23). Ordering occurs through the recognition of multiplicity 
and its differentiation (GS 7: 23). Dilthey described consciousness through its mode of 
comportment. Lived-experiences are differentiated not just by content and context but 
by the mode or way (the how) of the comportment. Lived-experience is structured in the 
occurrence of the relationship between modes of comportment and their contents and 
contexts (GS 7: 25). Dilthey articulated the “self” from its comportment and contexts 
rather than from consciousness or even a prerefl ective intentionality or passivity. It is the 
spatial-temporal comportment and social-historical orientation of the self that allows it 
to individuate itself in relation to itself, others, and the world.
Consciousness is only conceivable within the concrete conditions of life and the 
horizons of spatiality and temporality (GS 19: 42). In every moment (Augenblick) of our 
life, we are not without spatial orientation. Similarly, in each moment in which we fi nd 
ourselves and call the present, we are bound to the past (GS 19: 97). As consciousness 
is spatial, and bodily-worldly, as well as temporal, and social-historical, it can only be 
understood in addressing its facticity (GS 19: 51). Prior to the objectivity of the object 
and the subjectivity of the subject (GS 19: 68), this facticity is the “there,” the cogivenness 
of self and world in refl exive awareness. This “there” is not neutral and indifferent but 
“there-for-me,” which unfolds itself as the givenness of the object and the experience of 
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the subject. The “I” originates in the psycho-physical differentiation of self and world, of 
the “there,” through the “force of reality,” i.e., in the irresistible and irresolvable “violence 
of reality” (GS 19: 86). As it is conditioned by physical and social resistance, the self is 
always already conditioned and dependent on a reality external to itself; a reality that is 
thus not fi rst given much less constructed through theory or conceptual thought (GS 5: 
85). Lived-categories such as externality and internality arise from the bodily experience 
of the resistant world, as the self experiences the external world as beginning with its body 
and extending into an immeasurable distance (GS 5: 90). There is no absolute origin of the 
self for Dilthey, as it is constituted through an interruption that can be called traumatic. 
Reality is thus certain and given for a self-refl exive bodily being in the world, but this 
certainty and givenness presents itself as a question resisting resolution (GS 19: 87).
Dilthey corrected the precedence of theoretical thought without abandoning refl ective 
and theoretical inquiry. There is a difference in kind and not just degree between being 
and validity for him (GS 19: 87). Assertions of truth do not assert existence, but rather the 
character of reality in a hypothetical mode (GS 19: 87). Hence, contrary to the fundamental 
assumption of logicism and identity philosophy, thinking does not exhaust experience nor 
does the thought exhaust the experienced (GS 19: 36–37). Dilthey is depicting the worldly 
conditions of concept-formation rather than reducing their claim to truth and validity to 
their psychological and historical formation. He does not deny the legitimacy of abstrac-
tion and conceptualization, i.e., their claim to ideal validity, insofar as their “objects” are 
not taken to be entities outside of the discourse that formed them (GS 7: 81). Dilthey’s 
“nominalism” is not a reductive “historicism” and “psychologism” except from the prob-
lematic perspectives of Platonism and transcendental philosophy.
When thinking is divorced from considerations of its particular language and history, of 
context and content, thinking becomes purely representational and propositional. Thinking 
represents, according to this perspective, ideal validity and indicates it in statements without 
regard for the facticity that would be its undoing and which exposes its vulnerability. The 
weakness and fragility of knowing is hidden in the light of timeless and sovereign truth 
that knows no shadows. Contrary to metaphysics, Dilthey proposed interpreting, that is, 
describing and analyzing the given. Through such analysis, “the feeling of fragility, the 
power of hidden instincts, the suffering from darkness and illusion, [and] the fi nitude of 
all that is life” becomes visible (GS 7, 150).
Dilthey’s experientialism entails encountering the historicity of experience. Experi-
ence is more than the sense-impressions and associations of classical empiricism, as it 
is interpreted through its life-context with feeling (GS 7: 52) and will (GS 7: 61–62). As 
lived, experience is an event in relation to a context, and both sides of this oscillation are 
historical. Refl ecting the formation of historical worlds, concept-formation in the human 
sciences addresses the occurrences, structured processes, and practices that shape a histori-
cal form of life. The apparently fi xed objectivities and structures of historical life can be 
analyzed in relation to their productive nexus (Wirkungszusammenhang; GS 7: 153–154), 
which also discloses the transitoriness and disquiet of life (GS 7: 157).
The historicity of experience does not mean that experience can be subsumed in uni-
versal history or under a hierarchical principle of history, for this at best separates and 
prioritizes one experiential thread. Historicity entails in a sense the impossibility of the 
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philosophy of history taken as one unifying teleological order or narrative. Nonetheless, for 
Dilthey, individuals purposively and refl ectively engage in and narrate history even if there 
is no one inevitable metaphysically or theologically pre-determined teleological purpose 
or narrative to nature and history. Whereas historicity refers to the plural and temporal 
facticity of our socially mediated individual existence, history can be refl ectively articu-
lated as a preliminary “guiding thread” (Leitfaden) for practice and refl ection. Through 
historically oriented refl ection, lived-experience and the various conceptual constructs of 
the human sciences can be related to the realities of historical life.
Dilthey emphasized in his late work the formation of the historical world in the human 
sciences, a formation informed by and informing the historical character of human life 
(GS 7: 88). This formation is ideational yet needs to be receptive and answerable to the 
way (how) its object is given, just as all sciences need to respond to the mode of givenness 
of the objects that are their concern (GS 7: 89). Each science abstracts from a practical 
comportment toward the givenness of what it interprets and explains. The differences 
between the sciences occur through the experiential differentiation of their comportment 
in relation to the way in which their objects are given (GS 7: 89). Such givenness (Gege-
benheit) does not necessarily imply transparency or intelligibility, since there is always 
further and new facticity to the given (GS 7: 91). Facticity consequently haunts every 
science, as the phenomenality of the reality which disturbs conceptualization is irrevo-
cable (GS 7: 92). This haunting is a provocation that leads to the dynamics of scientifi c 
and conceptual transformation. Without the a posteriori, empirical, and non-conceptual 
challenging thought, history would be the logical self-unfolding of a concept.
Historicity for Dilthey signifi es an occurrence involving both passivity and activity 
(GS 7: 147). The historical is not the exclusive product of conscious activity, such that 
we could directly know it as our own product, since it is implicated in the facticity and 
the confl ict of forces (Kampf der Gewalten) of human life (GS 7: 187, 287–288). Histo-
ricity indicates then not the mastery but the fi nitude and fragility of human existence in 
the infi nity of its possibilities (GS 7: 150). Historical refl ection risks the incoherence of 
“bad infi nity” in exposing itself to what is other than itself and what cannot be digested; 
i.e., an infi nite folding of context and singularity, of whole and individual, of texture and 
overdetermination to which representation and the concept remain inadequate.
Dilthey proposed that the historicity (Geschichtlichkeit) of “free human nature,” a 
“nature” that is plural and singular rather than an essence or substance, is the basis of the 
study of history (GS 6: 108–109). As Dilthey noted: “We are historical beings before we 
are observers of history, and we are the latter only because we are the former” (GS 7: 278). 
In this case, the study of history is already structured by and cannot evade the historicity 
of human existence. Because of this basic historicity, understanding and interpretation are 
the refl exive ways by which humans understand their history. Yet the fact of historicity 
does not remove the need for the scientifi c study of history, as understanding is not direct 
intuition or revelation and requires the labor of conceptualization. Ordinary historically 
embodied understanding is transformed into the study of history, as empirical history is not 
irrelevant to confronting the historicity of human existence. Dilthey defended the study of 
history by historians, as interpretive from the fi rst person perspective of participants and as 
scientifi c from the third person perspective of observation and theory. Dilthey approached 
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history both through the interpretive relation of context and singular as well as the theoreti-
cal and explanatory relation between structure and event. The former is prioritized in the 
human sciences, given their relation to historical lived-experience and the life-nexus, yet 
the latter “objectifying” tendencies are not marginalized. There is no absolute separation 
between validity and facticity or cultural value and value-free nature.
The historical is the crossing of the singular and its contexts, in which it appears as 
singular. It is primarily occurrence or event rather than structure, and narrative rather than 
teleological purpose. Historical events evoke the narratives and self-narratives of individu-
als and groups, and these have an often implicit priority even for the most scientifi c of 
historians. Such narratives are not the universalizing narrative of reason but attempts to 
indicate and evoke singular relations between individuals and groups through the equally 
universalizing and forgetful medium of language. In this way, history is close to poetry. 
Narrative, in relation to the singular that is its truth, occurs as biography, autobiography, the 
history of groups and nations, but also in fi ction, prayer, and address. The linguistic styles 
that address the singular do not remain within the bounds of language’s representational 
and propositional structure. Language slides back into its own element of tensions, moods, 
feelings valuations, willing, wishing, praying, gesturing, and evoking the other (GS 19: 
5), and the “greatness” of the historian consists in the ability to give her- or him-self over 
(hinzugeben) to the other in her context (GS 7: 201).
Dilthey did not positivistically eliminate the immanent purposiveness of historical 
life and its narrative presentation in rejecting the strong external governing teleology of 
traditional metaphysics, theodicy, and the philosophy of history, as his “empiricism” is 
non-reductive and there are lived-experiences of purposiveness. Rudolf Makkreel has 
ascertained the importance of Kant’s Critique of Judgment, in particular its accounts of 
refl ective judgment and purposiveness without purpose, for Dilthey’s thought.29 Purposive-
ness, without one predetermined fi nal purpose that governs the whole, is articulated from 
out of the expressions and practices of historical agents located in the fi eld and tension of 
practical interests, while narrative is pluralized according to the multiple norms, values, 
and worldviews that inform it. Purposiveness and narrative are rethought by Dilthey in 
relation the immanent self-generating “categories of life,” the fi rst of which is temporality 
itself (GS 7: 192, 228–229).30 The categories of life are the immanent modifi able struc-
tures of lived-experience itself and articulate the generative and emergent signifi cance 
of life (GS 7: 232–233). These historically lived and enacted categories do not subsume 
particulars under a universal, they spring from the tension and confrontation of self and 
other, identity and alterity. The subject of these life-categories is, paraphrasing Dilthey, 
a concrete temporal and historical occurrence of life (Lebensverlauf) that is played forth 
in a body and individuated as a self in relations of the purposive and counter-purposive, 
i.e., through the force of externality, otherness (Fremden), and that which evades being 
experienced (GS 7: 203). The self is bound to a context of relations and conditions and 
is intrinsically related to an alterity that resists and possibly reverses it. History is never 
simply then the history of the plans, projects, and efforts of individuals and groups but 




Life, history, and society are not appropriately conceived as an undeviating teleological 
development, an unchanging system, or seamless totality. A historical life faces issues of 
its own incomprehensibility, incommensurability, and indeterminacy, as it is located in an 
immediacy and immanence lacking transparency and a relatedness missing unambiguous 
determinacy and undisturbed unity. Life resists universalization in confronting itself as 
its own life, e.g., me as my own life (GS 19, 346–47), in relation to the life that is not my 
own; that is, as an exposure to facticity, singularity, and contingency.31 Cognitive thought 
often ignores the singular that it fi nds unnecessary, yet truth does not only consist of the 
continuities and uniformities of tradition and common life but of “the unique, the singular 
and the individual” in their relation to what is typical and shared (GS 7: 71, 87).
We can cognize ourselves only indirectly (GS 7: 87), i.e., interpretively through our 
actions and expressions, insofar as the self is inexorably related to the alterity of the forces 
of life that Dilthey describes as “resistance, distance and strangeness” (GS 7: 131). There 
is no object or subject that we know as such, without interpretation, and that we do not 
experience as both “pressure and demand” (GS 7: 131). The individual does not exist as 
an isolated subject in and for itself; it becomes itself practically and historically in rela-
tion to itself, others, and its world. According to Dilthey, “The infi nite richness of life 
unfolds itself in individual existence because of its relations to its milieu, other humans 
and things. But every particular individual is also a crossing point of contexts which move 
through and beyond its particular life” (GS 7: 135). These intercrossing contexts constitute 
a relational medium or “between” in which the embodied individual responds, acts, and 
refl ects through its practices in relation and potential fi delity to historical life.
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